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i1.0 SUMMARY
_erc were *"-_ _nve_6atlvu aspects associa%ed with the loss of
the cryogenic oxygen tank pressure during the Apollo 13 flight. First,
what was the cause of the flight failure of cryogenic oxygen tank 2.
Second, what possible contributing factors during the grotund history of
the tank could have led to the ultimate failure in flight.
The first flight indication of a problem urred when the quailtity
, measurement in the tank went full scale about _ _1oursbefore the incident.
This condition in itself could not have contributed to ignition in the
tank, since the energy in the circuit is restricted to about 7 milli-
joules.
Data from the electrical system provided the seconl indication of a
problem when the fans in tank 2 were activated to reduce any stratifica-
tion which might have been present in the supercritieal oxygen in the
tank. Several short-circuits were detected and have been isolated to
the fan circuits of tank 2. The first short-circuit could have contained
as much as 160 joules of energy, which is within the current-protection
level of the fan circuits. Tests have shown that two orders of magnitude
less energy than this is sufficient to ignite the polytetrafluoroethylene
i_sulation on the fan circuits in the tank. Consequently., the evidence
indicates that the insulation on the fan wiring was ignited by the energy
in the short-circuit.
The burning in the tank then proceeded, causing the tank pressure
to rise to a peak value of 1008 psi, about half of the predicted tank
burst pressure at cryogenic temperature. At that time the relief valve
opened, as expected, and decreased the pressure in the tank. The burning
had progressed to the point by this time that all energized electrical
circuits to tank 2 had shorted and opened.
The next indication of a problcm occurz_d when accelerometer traces
in the command module showed vibration excitation with the largest ampli-
tude along the longitudinal axis. This _as apparently at the time that
the integrity of tank o w_-_ lost and the vacuum dome relief plug blew
out. The loss of tank pressure is concluded to have been caused by the
failure of the electrical conduit tube when the fire progressed into the
conduit. Tests under simulated conditions support this point of view.
The only place the wiring comes close to, or touches, the pressure vessel
is in the electrical conduit tubing at the top of the tank. To fail the
tank at any location other than the electrical conduit, without burning
metal inside, does not appear reasonable, particularly if only insulation
is burning in zero g.
%
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Following the rupture o_ the conduit tubing, the tank 2 pressure re-
mained above 880 psi to the point of data loss. If the tank pressure had
decreasea below 880 psi, the heaters would have come on automatically at,
that time. The heater circuits were energized during the data loss period.
Consequently, the evidence supports the theory of a small opening in the
tank venting into the bay which housed the cryogenic tanks. A fraction
of a second after the conduit failed, the pressure immediately increased
in the bay and blew the panel off. Thermal measurements show significant
heating was present just before the panel seoarated which indicated there
must have been an area burning exterlor to T_e pressure vessel. A rup-
tured tank that was d_uuping cold fluid would have caused a chilling cf
the temperature sensors. The data indicate that tank 2 remained in the
bay and photoanalys% s using sophisticated methods, believe the photo-
graphs reveal that at least part of tank 2 remained intact.
Many aftereffects resulted from the loss of tank 2 pressure integ-
rity. Most significant were the eventual loss of tank i pressure and the
loss of electrical power from two of the three fuel cells when the shock
of the panel separating caused the oxygen supply valves to close. More
important, however, was the fact that the condition was undetected since
a warning is given to the crew only when both hydrogen and oxygen valves
to a fuel cell are closed. O_gen system i developed a leak either as
the result of sho_:kwhen the panel separated, or from the dynamics of the
particular events associated with the failure of tank 2 electrical conduit.
The cryogenic oxygen tank 2 could not be off loaded after the initial
filling during the countdown demonstration test. The problem resulted
from loose or misaligned plumbing components of the dog-leg portion of
the tank fill path. Allowable manufacturing tolerances are such that the
tank may not be detanked normally. A test has verified this fact. The
condition of loose plumbing in the probe assembly, which existed in the
tank before the detanking, was Judged to be safe for flight in every
aspect.
The inability to perform a normal detsnking operation during the
countdown demonstration test led to the use of a special detanking pro-
cedure. The special detanking procedures failed the _ank heater thermal
switches to the closed position. An incompatibility between the voltage
output of ground power supply used for the heaters and the thermal switch
capacity resulted in fusing the contacts when operating in this mode for
the first time. This resulted in continuous heater-on times in excess
of 8 hours, which went undetected prior to flight. This condition over-
heated the insulation, causing major electrical wire insulation degrada-
tion (splits and cracks). Several mechanisms could have moved the fan
wiring and caused the shorted conditions which triggered the fire within
the tank and finally caused the loss of all service module o_gen.
!
1971001140-006
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The main substance of the investigation of the cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 anomaly is contained in this report. Additional information con-
cerning the tank 2 manufacturing and checkout histol_, the details of
the analyses, and Zhe results of the special tests conducted in support
of the _nvestigation will be forwarded under separate cover. This report
is Anomaly Report No. 1 to the Apollo 13 Mission Report (MSC-02500).
I
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_"_ 3._ 0 PERTINENT DATA
The significant system parameters for the period of interest ere
shown in figure 3-i. B_y 4 of the service module and the hardware
mounted in this area are shown in figure 3-2.
Approximately 9 hours prior to the period of interest, the quantity
gage in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 failed to full scale during a fan cycle.
At 55:53:20, the electrical fan circuits for cryogenic oxygen tank 2
' were energized. Approximately 2 seconds later, a momentary short was
indicated in the current from fuel cell 3. Within several seconds, two
other momentary shorted "onditions occurred.
The cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure increased from 880 to 1008 psi
in approximately 90 seconds with a plateau at h0 seconds. The pressure
then decreased to 996 psi in about 9 seconds. The fuel cell flow rates
responded to the press,,re profile.
_* The temperature in the tank rose rapidly during the final 25 sec-
onds of the pressure rise, then the measurement failed. The quantity
gage, which had previously failed, corrected itself and then failed
{_; again.
The command module accelerometers responded to a vibration disturb ........ '
anee about h20 milliseconds after the last pressure reading and to an
impulse about 340 millisecond_ later. Approximately hO milliseconds
later, all data from the spacecraft were lost for about 1.8 seconds.
Following recovery of the data, the spacecraft h_d experienced a trans-
lation change of 0.4 _t/sec primarily in a plane normal to the cryogenic
oxygen tank bay. Cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure read zero. The cryo-
genic oxygen tank 1 pressure was decaying rapidly, and its heaters were
on. A main "us B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart were present.
. Several structural temperatures in bays 3 and h were reading up to 8° F
higher than before the data loss.i '• The crew reported that they had heard and felt a sharp '_ang," coin-
cident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a mainbus B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, a _uick check of the
electrical pa_-ameter8 was _ade by the crew end all parameters appeared ' _
normal. However, the crew did report the following be-berpole indica-
tions :
a. Service module reaction control system helium 1 on quads B and D
b. Service module reacti_ control system heltum 2 cu quad D _:
¢. Service module _i_ control system 8econd_ propellant M_
valves on qua_ A and C. |
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About 2-1/2 minutes later, fuel cells 1 anu 3 ceased generating
electrical power. About 2 hours later, fuel cell 2 was turned off as a
result of :he pressure loss in cryogenic oxygen tank i.
Photographs taken after service module separat'e,_ _howed that the
bay 4 panel was missing and that one high-gain an_enn'_ horn was damaged.
l
r_
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94.0 DATA ANALYSIS
Th_s section analyzes the significant events relative to the inci-
dent involving cryogenic oxygen tank 2 and identified in section 3.0.
h.1 QUANTITY GAGE
The first anomalous inflight condition associated with the cryogenic
oxygen tank 2 occurred at 46:40:06 when the ac-powered destratification
fans in beth cryogenic oxygen tanks were turned on. Within about 3 sec-
onds after fan activation, the quantity measurement for cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 abruptly indicated full-scale high. This system indicates density
of the cryogenic oxygen by measuring its dielectric constant, which is a
function of density. This instrument is a capacitor which consists of
two concentric aluminum tubes inside the tank (fig. h-l).
Tests have shown that an open-circuit in the leads to the capacitor _
assembly or a short across the capacitor or its leads will drive the out- !
put to full scale. If this short-circuit is lemoved, the output signal I
drops abruptly from full scale to zero, and then in about a second, it I
settles out to the proper reading, as noted in the data of figure 4-2 ....... I
This agrees with the flight data _rom the quantity _;obe. Tests also I
show that if the inner tube is shorted to ground, the output may oscil- _
late in a random manner. Such an oscillation was noted several minutes
after d ._a reccvery following the incident. It should be noted that with
a short-circuit in the quantity gaging system inside the tank, the maxi-
mum current that could be drawn is 15 millismperes.
, 4.2 ELECTRICAL SHORTS
,- The configuration of the electrical power system at the time of the
incident is shown in figure 4-3, and the configuration of the electrical :'_
power to the cryogenic oxygen tanks is shown in figure h-4. As shown in _
figure h-5, three separate shorting events occurred following application _of power to e fan ci cuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. ji_]/,'i-,
The acbus 1 v°ltage dr°pped 1"2 vc_ts and the dc current increased _ii!i1.6 amperes when the cryogenic oxygen tank i fans were turned on
About 1.5 seconds later, when the crycgenic oy_gen tank 2 fans were _ :: '_
the ac bus 2 voltage drolA_ed 0.6 volt and the spacecraft cur-energized,
rent increased 1.6 amperes. The thrust vector control gimbal command
N
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data from the stabilization and control system indicated a corresponding
voltage transient. Testing on the stabilization and control system has
shown that a low voltage transient on ac bus 2 results in a transient on
the gimbal command data. The ac bus 2 voltage decrease and the spacecraft
current increase show that power was applied to the cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 fans (fig. 4-5) but does not indicate whether the fan motors were i
running, since the stall and run,Ling currents are essentially the same.
The ac voltage decrease and the spacecraft current increase for the
• fans in each tank were normal and agree with data from previous cryogenic
oxygen tank fan cycles. Also, the transient on the stabilization and
control system data appeared during previous tank fans cycles.
The first indication of a short on ac bus 2 appeared about 2-1/2 sec-
onds after activation of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fans. The ac bus 2
voltage dropped 1.2 volts, the fuel cell 3 current increased ll amperes
(fig. 4-5), and the stabilization and control system gimbal command data
experienced a transient. Subsequent to the short, the spacecraft current _!
data show a decrease of 0.8 ampere from the level Just prior to the short, j
Also, the ac bus 2 voltage started to toggle-up 0.6 volt, or one data bit i
(fig. 4-5). These data indicate that a load was removed from ac bus 2 I
and that it was approximately one-half the load normally applied when the
cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fans were turned on. This indicates that a short
in one of the two fan motor circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 caused ......._
its fUses to blow.
The second indication of shorting occurred about 15 seconds later
when phase A of ac bus 2 voltage increased 1.8 volts. Since the i:_verter
attempts to maintain a constant average 3-phase voltage, this increase in
phase A indicates a voltage decrease on phase B or C of the ac bus 2 caused
by an increased load.
• Approximately 200 milliseconds later, the ac bus 2 voltage momen-
tarily decreased ll volts (fig. h-5), and the total spacecraft c_rrent
increased 3.5 amperes, indicating an increased load. After the momen-
tary decrease, the ac bus 2 voltage reading was 0.6 volt less than the
" previous indication. This could be an indication that a single phase
short on phase B or C was removed by blowing a fuse.
About 20 seconds after the first short, the third ac bus 2 short
occurred. Fuel cell 3 current increased 23 amperes, and the stabiliza-
tion and control system data again indicated a transient (fig. 3-1).
Subsequently, the total spacecraft current level decreased to the same
level as it was prior to turning on the cryogenic o_gen tank 2 fans.
This indicates that power to the remaining cryogenic o_gen tank 2 fan
was removed by blowing its fuses due to this short. Also, tbe ac bus 2
voltage increased to t_:e same level as that prior to turning the tank 2
fans on (fig. _-5).
1971001140-018
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The electrical energy that could not be accounted for by normal
spacecraft loads (fig. 4-5) is attributed to the shorts. Calculations
were made of the maximum energy levels that could have been transmitted
through the circuit during these shorted conditions and that wculd still
meet the constraints imposed by the flight data resolution and _aa_llng
times, inverter performance, fuse clearing time, and dc and ac :_us volt-
age sensor performance. Inverter performance and fuse clearing time tests
were performed to provide data for the energy calculatlons. The energy
calculations are summarized in table 4-I.
The spacecraft current data show that the heaters were not on prior
to the data loss. The heaters were set for automatic operation and the
cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure switch was open, thereby preventing
application of power to the heaters in either tank. In the automatic
mode, the heaters in both tanks are energized simultaneously when the
pressure switches for tanks 1 and 2 are closed (fig. h-6). When data
were reacquired after the incident, the spacecraft current indicated that
heaters in one of the cryogenic oxygen tanks had automatically been ener-
gized. For this to occur, the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure must have
dropped below the switch actuation point during the data loss. The
tank 1 pressure was already below the switch actuation point. The cryo-
genic oxygen tank 1 heaters came on because they were the only operative
heaters when manually actuated later• &he heaters use the same power
circuitry to the tanks during manual and automatic operation. !|
At about the time of the shock to the 6pacecraft, a master alarm [
and a main bus B undervoltage light were noted coincident with a computer irestart. The voltage must decrease to below about 18 volts for at least
15 microseconds before a computer restart will occur. This event would
, indicate a hard short on both main Buses because the computer receives
its power, through diodes, from both buses. An undervoltage light on
main bus B only would be most probable because only one fuel cel.l supplies
its power, while bus A power is supplied by two fuel cells. The main bus
voltage must be below 26 volts for longer than 70 milliseconds for an
undervoltage indication to occur. The most likely cause of such a low
voltage for that length of time is a short in the wiring to the tank
pressure switches that control the heaters (fig. _-6), resulting from the 0
cryogenic oxygen tank failure. This circuit receives power from both
buses through lO-_pere f_sas located in the service module. The short
must have occurred after closure of the pressure switchel which provide
power to drive the motor switch, sines the motor switch must _ole in
order to apply power to the tank heaters in the mut_attc heater _omtrol
mode. Cryogeuic c_pn tank 2 heaters did not come on bec&_e the dr-
cuits were open.
P
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TABLE h-I.- DELTA ENERGY CALCULATIONS
t
AC
AC DC Time Total fault
level, Watts
amperes volts amperes constraints energy, Joules=
Single-phase short ii
• 0.2 115 23 1 13.6 sec 313 !
1,5 lll 167 9 (2) 200 ms 33
2.0 ii0 220 12 (2) :00 ms hJ
2.5 109 273 lh (2) 200 ms 55 i
3.0 107 321 17 (i) 120 ms 39 !
_ h.0 105 h20 23 (i) 31 ms 13
5.0 i02 510 28 (i) 20 ms lO
7.0 95 666 36 (i) i0 ms 7
9.0 75 675 37 (1) 8 ms 5
12.0 _, 48 13 (l) _,ms 0.2
=,
Two-phue short
O.1 i15 i1.5 1 13.6 see 313
i.5 111 167 lh (2) 200 ms 67
2.o llO 220 19 (2) 200ms 88
2.5 109 273 23 (2) 200 ms 109
3.0 i07 321 28 (i) 120 ms 77
h.0 10h h16 36 (I) 31 ms 26
5.o ioi 505 45 (1) 20 ms 20
7.o 80 560 58 (1) 1o ms 11
9. o _5 _00 _ (l) 8 ms 6
l =
Three-phase short
_i; 0.07 115 7.7 1 13.6 sec 313
,. l.5 111 167 22 (2) 200 _ i00
2.o _0 220 31 (2) 2o0,- 132
2.5 lO9 _73 39 (2) 200 ,- 16_
3.0 107 321 _7 (_) 70 ms 23
h.O lOb _16 65 (I) 31 ms 39
5.0 1ol 505 8_ (1) 2oms 3a.
7.0 90 630 105 (1) 10 ms 19
9.0 1o 90 25 (z) 8 m s
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h.3 CRYOGENIC OXYGEN TANK 2 PRESSURE TRANSIENT
The interface of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 with the oxygen sy_r.em
is shown in figure 4-7.
The internal components of the tank and location of the wiring are
shown in figure h-8. The oxygen temperature is measured from ;:ithin the
tank as shown. Tank pressure is measurea external to the tank in the
valve module (fig. 4-9) and is sampled once per second. The pressu_-e
• switch which controls the automatic heater circuits is attached to the
valve module.
The electrical data show that power w_s applied to both fan motors
in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. It seems probable that one, s_d possibly
both, fan motors came on, but this cannot be detezmined conclusively from
the pressure data. Further, the electrical data confirm that the oxygen
tank heaters were not energized.
The time history of cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure variations dur-
ing the last fan cycle can be divided into three regions (fig. h-lO)o
The first region is the pressure rise which began Just after the fans
: were turned on and lasted for h0 seconds, when a i!stinct change in the
i pressure rise rate occurred.
The second region covers e hS-second tim, interval from the pressure
plateau to the peek pressure of 1008 psia. The third region is character-
ized by about a 12-psia pressure dro; over a 9-second period, after which
data were lost. A detailed discussion of the last 800 milliseconds before
data loss is presented in section _.6.5.
_.3.1 Tank Pressure Data Analysis
Since the pressure transducer is located i,, a flow line and not on
the tank itself, an investigation was conducted to inaure that the pres-
sure data are, in fact, a valid indication of pressure in the oxygen
• tank.
i Tests on the sensor in the system show that the seasor will respond
4
from zero to full scale in 5 milliseconds to a step input. The system,
including the plumbi_, has a of less th an 30 milliseconds, ;
res_onae
The transducer t8 locate_ in the valve aodule (fig. _-9), alons vtth I"
the relief valve, and is about 20 feet of line leith from the tank cavity _
(flg. _-7). The pressure measurement has been refilled as repreeent_Ive _."_
of the s_t_ pressure tm the t ank ID tWO teste ttQdar _g¢ _Dgli_ODIi
m
I
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with flow through the relief valve using simulated flight system hardware.
With high pressure gas, the measurement given by the transducer was within
18 psi of the actual tank pressure. With cryogenic oxygen, the trans-
ducer reading was within 9 psi of the actual tank pressure.
Another validation of the pressure transducer under d,vnamic pressure
conditions consisted of integrating the flow rate change to the fuel cell
(fig. h-ll). This calculation substantiated the tank pressure peak as
about 1008 psia. Throughout the mission, both tank pressures were read-
ing as expected, further substantiating their validity.
The pressure rise rates shown in f_gure h-10 can be describeU ana-
lytically by various thermodynamic processes. All thermodynamic calcula-
tions on pressure rise, heat input, mass flow, etc. were performed using
data on the "real gas" properties. In the supercritical region, devia-
tions from ideal gas relationships can he extremely large.
The maximum energy input to satisfy the observed pressure rise is
a constant density heating process. This condition is shown by the upper
curve of figure 4-12. A second process, which establishes the mir.imum
energy input, is an isentropic compression of the fluid. This compression
L is represented by all the energy input being confined to a small bubble,
which has no mass. The resulting thermodynamic state is one of higher
pressure in the tank. The result of this process is depicted by the lower
! curve of figure h-12 ...... _
j In actuality, the energy input into the tank lies somewhere between
i the maximum and minimum energy input curves shown in the figure. The
i process is modeled by a hot Oxygen bubble of constant uniform tempera-
!
,_ ture, growing at a rate sufficient to isentropically compress the sur-
rounding cryogenic oxygen. This formulation accounts for mass transfer
i both to the hot mass (to increase the volmne) and from the hot mass (tank
I outflow). This mass transfer requires a larger energy input to sustain
the pressure rise. The center curve of figure h-12 shows a comparison -
of this model with the maximum and minimum energy models. The results
(fig. h-13) are dependent upon the temperature of the hot mass. Note
that while the energy input increases by approximately 300 percent, the t
hot mass volume changes only lO percent. Therefore, the energy source is
confined to a small region within the tank, and is essentially independ-
ent of the _emperature of the burning material.
1
l
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4.3.2 Region I and II Analysis
There are only two plausible mechanisms for the s]ope chsnges on
the pressure-time curve during regions I and II: a change in the mass
outflow characteristics or a change in the energy input characteristics.
Several analyses were performed in an attempt to relate changes in mass
outflow characteristics to the pressure curve. These studies show that
the only reasonable explanation for the observed pressure characteris-
tics is a rapidly changing combustion rate within the tank.
h.3.3 Region llI Analysis
Region III is the portion of the pressure-time curve that is de-
creasing quite rapidly, from 1008 psia to 996 psia in about 9 seconds.
The analysis of the events in this time period must necessarily include
a discussion of the relief valve characteristics. The accepts_ice test
of this relief valve showed the valve started to open at 100h psia and
was zully open at 1005 psia. The relief valve flow capability, which has
been established by test, is much greater than the flow rate required to
produce the observed pressure decay in region III (fig. h-lh). In fig-
ure h-15, note that the relief valve has the capability to relieve the
pressure more rapidly than observed, even considering that the energy
input is increasing exponentially.
There are at least two possible ways to explain the observed pres- ; _.
sure response. One is a partial restriction of the flow and the other
is a change in the combustion rate within the tank. There are several
conditions which could lead to parti.ul restriction of the flow, but the
simplest of these is a restriction in the relief valve itself.
A change in the combustion rate could easily account for the slower-
than-expected pressure dec_y after the relief valve opened. In order to
properly account for the increase in combustion rate, it is necessary to
consider about the last 2 seconds of region II. At this point, the pres-
sure is 1004 psia, the relief valve crack pressure. When the relief
valve opens, the velocity at the filter (inside the oxygen tank) increases.
It is hypothesized that this increase in velocity provides both a convec-
tive force field and additional oxygen to the combustion source. When the
relief valve opens fully the local velocity increases to a maximum. A ii_,
further postulation is that this yields a maximum burning rate which raises
the pressure to 1008 psia. The relief valve flow then decreases the pres-
sure, although the combustion rate remains high. A heat input rate 6f
approximately 2 Btu/sec will raise the pressure from 100h psia to 1008 psia
with the relief valve open. A constant heat rate of approximately l-i/h i_ I
1
Btu/sec will match the observed pressure dec_v in region III (fig. h-15). _:_
This energy input rate is about two and one-half times larger than the
exponential rate of region II. _
F_L__| 1
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When data were recovered after the incident, the cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit, which means that either
the pressure at the transducer was, in fact, zero or that the measurement
had failed electrically. The p_'essure reading would go to zero if the
feedline failed or the pressure in the tank was zero.
4.3.4 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank i Pressure Decay
An analysis was conducted to cetermine what hardware damage was re-
quired to explain the loss of oxygen from cr_yogenic oxygen tank 1. Fig-
ure 4-16 compaz'es the cryogenic oxygen tank 1 pressure decay with the
pressure decay rate computed, assuming chokea *'low. Also, cross-plotted
on this figure are the integrated flow-rate curve and the quantity gage
_ata. This latter curve tends to substantiate t_e analytical approach.
'_e analysis yields an effective flow area of approximately 0.005 in2.
This area is of the same order as the line on the pressure switch; a
flow area this small could also result from a crimp in any of the lines
from cryogenic oxygen tank I.
4.4 CRYOGENIC OXYGEN TANK 2 TEMPEPATU_E
While the pressure was rising sharply in cryogenic oxygen tank 2,
changes occurred in the temperattu'e indication (flg. 4-10). The tempera-
ture data are obtained from a sensor located on the quantity probe assembly
(fig. 4-8) within the tank. _he temperature increased about 2° F during
the first pressure rise (region I). A temperature increase of this magni-
. tude is in accord with that expected due to the pressure rise alone.
The significant aspect of the temperature data is the rapid rise
rate commencing approximately 2h seconds prior to loss of data (fig. 4-i0).
Sever_l analyses were performed to interpret the data. The results indi-
cated that a temperature range of 600 ° to 2900° F could produce the oh-
• served response. This viSe temperature span is a result of the geometric
configurations which are possible. The significant results from these I|i
analyses confirmed that the combustion source was near the sensor during
the period of rapid temperature rise, Just prior to the loss of data, - _
the temperature dropped to zero, Indicating an open circuit failure in I "-
the mee_ureMent circuit, l
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_.5 PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
4.5.1 Photographic Data
The photographic data used in this analysis included onboard photog-
raphy of the service moaule taken by the crew after the service module
was separated from the command module. The onboard photography was of
marginal quality and included the following:
a. Twenty-six frames of 70-am (magazine N) SO 368 Ektachrome MB
color film, using the Hasselblad hand-held camera with the 250-mm lens
b. Forty-three frames of 70-ms (magazine R) 3400 Panatomic X black
and white film, using the Hasselblad hand-held camera with the 80-am lens
c. Nineteen fzames of 16-ms (magazine FF) SO 368 Ektachrome MS color
film, using the hand-held motion picture camera with the 75-mm lens.
i The average distance from the Hasselblad cameras to the service mod-
ule for the onboard photography was about 410 feet for magazine R and
' about 880 feet for magazine N, resulting in an image scale of i:1500 and
1:1077, respectively. Of the frames showing the service module, orienta-
tion was such that the majority do not show bay 4, and at no time are the
sun angle and camera vi__ simultaneously directed into bay 4.
In an effort to draw detail out of the high density in the area of
the normal location of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 in bay 4 _ two black
•, and white frames (AS13-59-8500 and -8501) and three color frames
(AS13-58-8462, -8464, and -8465) ware subjected to photographic process-
ing enhancement for specific details. These same frames were also sub-
Jected _o electrcnic scanning with an image digital construction tech-
nique similar to that used on the Surveyor lunar surface photography.
Assisting the Photographic Technology Laboratory at the Manned Spacecraft
Center were the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, McDonnell-Douglas Corporation,
• LogEtronics Incorporated, Ciba Corporation, and Data Corporation with
their specialized techniques, facilities, and experienced personnel.
After exhausting all means of enhancement from the masters, the original
film was taken to Data Corporation, Da_rton, Ohio, to be scanned with
their high-intensity, 1-micron probe and digitally reconstructed to bring
out the detail for analysis.
I Without the benefit of sharp, well-lighted views of the bay _ area,such as are available in the preflight closeout photographs, it was nec-
essary to obtain all the available information from each of the better
frames and then to combine the findings. This approach was also imed in
examJning the transparencies and prints of individual frames at each
stage of er.: _rgement and enhancement.
iJl = m " I I ,
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In addition, the contact and enlarged transparencies, combined with
the digitized enhancements, showed where the Mylar/Kapton was blocking,
or shadowing, to hide certain component areas, qhe information was re-
constructed into a scale mode], which confirmed the presence of hard
point components presenting different reflective surface, such as the
oxygen and hydrogen tank surfaces, as well as the influence of the Mylar,/
Kapton highlights and blacks.
4.5.2 Onboard Photography Analysis
Figure 4-17a shows cryogenic oxygen tank 2 as it appeared at the
time of bay 4 closeout and figure 4-17b identifies the features shown.
Figure 4-18a sh_s frame 8464 of the 70-ramcolor film taken through !
the window of the lunar module. Figure 4-18b identifies the principal
features. Figure 4-19a shows frame 8501 of the 70-ramblack and white
film and the principal features are identified in figure 4-19b.
Figure 4-20 shows the 1/6 scale model with fuel cells tipped, Mylar
and Kapton insulation extended, skin panel removed as in frame 8464, but
with a bright metal oxygen tank having a clean Tnconel-type surface. Fig-
ure 4-21 shows the 1/6 scale model the same as in figure 4-20 except with
cryogenic oxygen tank 2 discolored brown. Figure 4-22 shows the same
i 1/6 scale model except with oxygen tank 2 removed.
Figure 4-18 and 4-19 are representative of the best onboard photog-
raphy analyzed by stereo plotter, monocular photographic interpretation,
i enlarging and enhancement, electronic scanning and digitizing, and by
model simulation. The results inaicate the following:
a. The fuel cells (1 and 3) are tipped slightly forward (outboard)
so the rear of the fuel cell shelf apparently was raised.
_ b. The insulation blanket was removed _om the underside of the
fUel ce.!l shelf near radial beam 3 and above oxygen tank 2, since the
color of the bare shelf is visible.
c. Mylar and Kapton insulation blo_a, torn, and/or partially burned
free from its initial fastening, now congest some areas of the bs_rand
extend outside the service module from several places along the edges of
shelves and beams.
d. The oxygen tank 2 appears to be present and discolored. _ecause
of the blackness of the non-ill_nated remaining interior, al_nized
Mylar and Kapton, and the discoloration of the oxFgen tank 2, the blend
%
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of brown and black does not show on photographic prints and is only dis- _
cernible by subtle color change in the enhanced transparenci_ of frame _L
8465 which provides the most direct look into the unlighted area of the
oxygen tank in bay 4.
e. The electrical cable to cryogenic oxygen tank 2 is identified
by its length and point of attachment to the oxygen shelf. The tank
attachment free end extends upwards and outwards from the shelf _
(fig. 4-19).
f. Reflections from the end domes, body, and some connections on
the hydrogen tank indicate it is apparently externally sound and in proper
posJ tion.
f-
g. A portion of the bay 4 panel remained attached at the forward
end by radial beam 3, and the lower access panel remained attached to
the service module at the aft end of beam 3.
h. One of the four reflectors and feeder horns for the high-gain
antenna was damaged. The attitude of the antenna, with the damaged re- |
flector nearest the service module, had changed since the incident be-
I_ cause the gimbals are free to rotate whenever the power is turned off.;_ i. The oxygen service panel appeared in its ;_ormal position, but
_-_ with considerable loosened Mylar and Kapton in the area.
j. A brown stain was observed on the outside surface of the service• propulsion system engine nozzle extension, near the plus Z axis, and in
_._ line with the vent path from the vent annulus around the nozzle.
_,_ 4.5.3 Ground Photography
_-i Three of the observatories tracking the spacecraft took photographs
of a nebulosity or cloud that appeared shortly after the incident.%
Such a cloud, having a maximum measured diameter of 25 nautical
"J miles, appeared on a photograph from the Manned Spacecraft Center !6-inch
_/ telescope at approximately 56 hours.
" Analysis of a photograph taken through the telescope at Mount K)bau
Observatory, British Columbia, at 58 hours 27 minutes, about 2-1/2 hours
after the incident, indicated that approximately 20 pounds of oxygen
would be required to form the observed cloud. The characteristics of
cloud shape and axes alignment indicate that it was not formed by an In-
stantaneous release of oxygen.
, , w I ml mm i
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(a) Cryogenicoxygentank 2. _,.
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Figure 4-17.- Bay 4 closeoutphotography. I:_
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(b) Identification of features in figure 4-17a.
Figure 4-17.- Concluded.
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(a) Onbo_d cameraview
, Figure 4-18.- 70-mm film frame 8464. ,_
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Figure 4-22.- Model without oxygen tank 2 and lighting simila_ to onboard frame 846,_.
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4.6 SERVICE MODULE BAY 4 PANEL SEPARATION
This section discusses the sequence of events immediately preceding,
dur _g, and immediately following the separation of the outer shell panel
fr bay 4 of the service module. A description of the associated struc-
tu_ 'd its failure mode is presented first, followed by a discussion
of _ne cryogenic oxygen tank 2 structure and how Jt might fail. Nsxt,
the events occurring during the last second of _ata prior to the incident
are discussed.
4.6.1 Bay 4 Structural Description
Bay h of the service module with the exterior shell panel removed,
is shown in figure 3-2. The exterior shell panel is bonded aluminum
honeycomb 1-inch thick; the exterior facesheet is 202h-T81 (O.020-inch
thick over most of the panel with a triangular section of 0.O16-inch
thickness at the upper end), the interior facesheet is 7178-T6 (0.010-
inch thick), and the perforated core is 5052~H39 (3/16 by O.O007-inch,
2.2lb/ft3).
The panel has several small doors, for servicing the tanks and fuel
cells located in bay 4, and one large door located in the lower left-hand
corner of the panel as viewed from the service module exterior, The ,,,
panel is fastened at the periphery by 1/h-inch bolts (NAS I134C) on approx-
imately 2-inch spacing and to the three shelves (fuel cell, oxygen, and
i hydrogen) by bolts _ each shelf.
Bay h is enclosed at the top by the 1-inch thick aluminum honeycomb
_" service module forward bulkhead and at the bottmn by the 3-inch thick
i aluminum honeyccmb aft bu3/_head. Radial beams 3 and h bound the left
and right sides of bsy h, respectively, as viewed from the service
module exterior. Bay h is open to the center tunnel except for three
areas. One 0,032-inch sheet extends 18 inches from the forward bulkhead
and one 0.020-inch sheet extends between stations X 933 and X 9h2. The
inner radial beam caps are laterally supported, a a , I
Z• Three shelves are made of aluminum honeycomb and have the following ,construct ion:i
a. Fuel cell - Two i_ches thick with _7178-T6 facesheets chemlc_lly
milled to 0.020 and 0.035 inch. The _ore is 3/16 by 0.0015 inch.
" b. O_,gen - Two inches thick with 7075-T6faceaheets of 0.030 to
0.060 inch. The core is 3/16 by 0.003 inch.
c. N_drogen - One and one-half inches thick with 7075-T6 facesheets _-
of 0.015 inch. The core is 3/16 by 0.0015 inch. __,_'
.}
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Insulation consisting of 28 layers of 0.15-rail aluminized Mylar
sandwiched between two Asters of 0.5O-nLil aluminized Kapton is attached
to specific bay 4 surfaces with Velcro patches. The insulation is lo-
cated o_ the tunnel section of the fuel cell bay, on i,e bea_s, and
shelves of the cryogenic bays, and on the panel from the aft bulkhead
to the fuel cell shelf.
4.6.2 Bay 4 Panel Structural Behavior
The bay 4 panel may be structurally idealized as a cylindrical shell
segment supported elastically at its boundaries. The radial beams pro-
_ide support in the axial and radial directions along the meridians of
the panel. Tangential support along those boundaries is provided by the
adjacent shell panels which are supported by the forward and aft bulkheads.
The forward and aft bulkheads provide radial and circumferential support.
The panel and radial beams have 5/16- and 9/32-inch attachment holes,
respectively, with large tolerances to allow removal and reinstallation
of the panel when the spacecraft is on the launch pad. The maximum free
movement at a single bolt would be 0.0975 inch considering the max__mum
dimensions of the hole in the panel and radial beam and the minimum bolt
diameter.
i Two simplified limiting cases may be used to describe the basic
structural behavior of the panel. The first considers the panel as a
flat plate supported on all edges. In this case the panel transfers
loads to the boundary by bending. The second c_e considers the panel
| as a pure membrane which transfers loads into attachments by in-plane
extension. The photographs of the service module show failure at the
attachments alrng all the boundaries except for a small piece of struc-
ture (approximately 6 by 4 inches) in the upper lei_-hand corner (viewed
from the exterior). If the panel behaved as a flat plate and failed
cleanly at the attachments, the bolts would fail in tension at approxi-
mately 51.00pounds per bolt. This load on the bolt would require a
shear load in the adjacent core of 785 pounds/inch which is greater than
; 3 times the core-failure load. Since no facesheet nor core is evident
• along the edge, the structure did not behave as the simplified model of ,_
a flat plate.
Because of the evidence which suggested primarily membrar,e behavior,
i simpliried representations of the structure were used to investigate its
I behavior. Structural analyses were performed for numerous pressure dis-tributions as well as for temperature gradients for both hot and cold ,_
inner faceshepts. The results show that the peak pressure must exceed
20 psi and that temperature gradients of interest result in small edge
loads. The static allowables for failure with a failure mode of shear
tearout are shown in figure _-25.
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4.6.3 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Structure
The cryogenic oxygen tank is fabricated from Inconel 718 and is com-
posed of two hemispheres assembled by fusion welding. A sketch of the
tank is shown in figure 4-24. The basic wall thickness of 0.059 inch
with increasing thickness at the welds and boss areas. The inside radius
is 12.528 inches. The l,mit design pressure (maximum operating pressure)
is 1025 psi, proof pressure is 1367 psi, and design burst pressure at
ambient temperature is 1538 psi. Structural analyses have predic._d a
positive margin at design conditions ; burst tests using liquid nitrogen
demonstrated burst strengths in excess of 2200 psi. Preflight fracture
mechanics analysis of cryogenic oxygen tank 2 predicted that no flaw prop-
agation would occur until a pressure of 1050 psi was reached and that the
failure mode at pressures less than 1240 would be lee_kage.
4.6.4 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Fracture Mechanics
Figures 4-25 and 4-26 show the fracture mechanics data of the cryo-
genic oxygen tank. For the base material and the weld, as well as for
heat-affected zone materials, the mode of failure is leakage at pressures
up to those above proof pressure.
Cryogenic oxygen tank 2 was operating we]3. within the fracture mec-
hanics limits for sustained flaw growth; hence, neither leakage nor rapid
fracture would be expected due to propagation of pre-existing flaws under "
the influence of pressure alone. Test data indicate that the addition of
polytetrafluoroethylene combustion products to oxygen, and the immediate
exposure of the mixture to a moderately stressed flaw, generated no de-
tectable evidence of rapid sustained-load flaw growth.
Localized heating of the tank material is the probable mode of the
loss of tank pressure integrity and is supported by all known test analy-
ses and by telemetry data. Considering that only polytetrafluoroethylene
was buzzing in the tank, then the only place where the polytetrafluoro-
ethylene comes close to_ or touches, the pressure vessel wall is in the
: electrical conduit. Tests of burning insulation in the electrical con-
. duit shows that in a few seconds the generated heat fails the tube. Fol-
> lowing the tube failure, the pressure In the annulus region would rapidly
rise until the exterior shell burst dlsk (approximately 3 square inches)
would rupture at approximately 80 psia.
I i i ,I i i
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h.6.5 Significant Structural Events
The following interpretation and Judgement c? the most probable se-
quence of events are based on all applicable data in the 0.80-second
time period prior to th_ loss of data (figs. 4-27 and 4-28).
At 55:5h:52.763 the last pressure data from tank 2 were recorded as
996 psia and the pressure was rapidly decreasing. The fuel cell flow-
maters were responding accordingly. Beyond the last pressure point, the
pressure can be interpreted from fuel cell flow r__ s (fig. h-28). Note
the _ "" "_o. rates gradu_!ly decreased and th_n o arte_ to increase slightly.
This can be interpreted to mean that the relief valve closed or that the
burning rate increased.
The data at the following times are interpl'eted to be the first loss
of pressure system integrity, s._dthe vibration experienced during this |
time period is interpreted to be due to venting of the tank through the |
vacul/m annulus. |
a. At 55:5h:53.182 command module accelerations in the X, Y, and Z
axes indicated response of less thm_ O.5g, O.lg, and 0.25g peak to peak,
respectively, with an estimated frequency of 15 to 25 hertz.
b. At 55:54:53.204 the stabilization and control thrust vector con-
trol command in pitch and yaw indicates an osc_llation of approximately
18 to 20 hertz, which is increasing with time. The results of full-
i scale testing of the docked command and service modules and lunar module
to determine guidance and navigation transfer function were reviewed, as
were the analytical mode shapes. These data revealed a mode at 18.76
hertz which exhibited the characteristic of motion in the area of the
! oxygen tank and rotational displacement at the rate 8yros. Ass_,-_ing
i percent critical damping, the minimum harmonic forcing function was
calculated to be 325 pounds at 18.76 hertz. The analysis shows that a
I forced vlbration was present during this period.
c. At 55:5h:53.271 the flow rate to the fuel cells reached a peak
value. Based on the last prescure reading and the integration of the
flow rates, the oxygen tank pressure at _his time is estimated to have
been less than 996 psia.
_" d. The next data from the fuel celltheflowrate shOWflowmetersad crease_tthe'and _
{ may he interpreted as a change in the venting area from the initial indi-
cation of a leak. However, changes in hydrogen
same time place doubt on the meaning of the dropoff. Such a decrease
could come from increased o_gen flow because of expulsion of the wiring
from the controlling _rea or an extension of the original leak area due
to increasing temperature. -_
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Based on spacecraft current data measured at 55:54:53,h72, the
heaters did not come on and tank 2 pressure was above 878 psia, the
heater-on point.
At 55:54:53. 511, the command module X-axis accelerometer indicated
minus 0.56g (fig. 4-27). This is interpreted as the start of the rapid
pressurization of the bay. The Y and Z axis accelerometers responded
20 milliseconds later.
At 55:54:53.555, the data loss began. Based upon the damage noted
in the photographs, this is interpreted as an impact by the separated
bay 4 panel on the antenna.
a. The panel was subjected to a rapid overpressurization. To be
consistent with the structural mechanics, the available strength, and
the observed evidence, the peak pressures are estimated to have exceeded
20 psi.
b. An analysis of the kinematics and _vnamics of the panel was per-
formed. It was assumed that the panel failed very quickly and that con-
tact of the panel and the high-gain antenna was limited to the damage
observed to only one of the antenna dishes. The position of the antenna
is shown in figure 4-29. The results of this analysiE determined a re-
quired axis of rotation of the panel (fig. 4-23). Assuming a constant
location of the line of action of the applied force, an approximate center
of pressure can be located.
,,.'
c. The foregoing analysis is consistent with the available strength
(fig. _-23). The axis of rotation required to satisfy the kinematics of
panel separation, the available strength, _nd the photographic evidence
support the origin of failure on the left aide of the panel as viewed
fr_ the exterior. The response of the Y and Z axes acceierometers noted
at 55:5_:53.531 is consistent with a minus Y and minus Z force applied
over 15 to 20 milliseconds. Analysis of the vehicle _amics indicates
a 900 to 1500 lb-sec impulse was experienced by the spacecraft. Such an
impulse would require an initial total force greater than 60 000 pounds.
The variation in strength with a failure mode of shear tearout in the
panel is shorn for loads applied perpendi_ar to the boundary. The
allowable load applied parallel to the boundary is bounded by shear of
the fastener at approximately 2200 lb/in.
Evidence of pressure and heat in the beQr is indicated f_ the re-
sponse of the temperature meuurement8 diseuned in section _.7. The _
response of a measurement located On the outboard side of the oxidizer
storage tank in ba_ 3 confirm failure of the web of radial beam 3. _lv]
Damage to the beam caused the |hiftinE of the fuel emil Ihe!f.
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Separation of the panel induced high shock loads to the service
module as the ao_a_hments failed along the boundary and at the bay 4
shelves. This shock closed the .-eactant valves in the fuel cell oxygen
system, as well as several reaction control propellant isolation valves.
Either the tank 2 feedline or the pressure transducer wiring or
plumbing was severed during the loss of data. This explains the zero
reading of low scale on tank 2 when data were recovered at 55:54:55.763.
Figure 4-30 shows the plumbing and wiring on the oxygen shelf which were
functional following data recovery. The figure also shows the location
of the electrical leads to tank i. After the event, the quantity and
temperature sensing systems, heaters, and fans operated. The operation
of these circuits and the location of the wire bundle of tank 1 with re-
spect to tank 2 suggests there was no electrical damage associated with
the loss of tank 2 pressure. Further, the motor-operated switch box
through which all heater power goes for both tanks was still operative.
4.7 THERMAL EFFECTS ON SERVICE MODULE
J
Prior to the incident, all temperature transducers responded as ex-
pected. At the time of the incident the following measurements
(fig. 4-31) indicated abnormal temperature responses:
(a) Bay 3 oxidizer storage tank surface :'....
(b) Service propulsion helium supply line on bey 3 side cf beam 3
at the inner edge of the beam
(c) Bay 3 reaction control quad C helium tank
(d) Fuel cell radiator glycol outlet lines on beam 4 in bey 4
(e) Fuel cell radiator glycol inlet lines on beam 4 in bey h.
The bay 3 oxidizer tank surface temperature increased from 73.h°
to 77.7° F in about 20 seconds (fig. 4-32). The temperature then de-
creased to 60° F about 2-i/_ hours later. Data received during the two
command and service module power-up cycles at 101:55:5_ and 123:05:25
showed 60° and 65.3° F, respectively. The rise rate of bey 3 servlce
propulsion system oxidizer surface temper&ture is indicative of direct
heating in the vicinity of the transducer, which is attached to the tsnk
skin end covered with 30 ls_ers of insulatiom.
Heat inputs to the bey 3 service propulsion tank surface transducer
depend on the thermal integrity of the multilsyer insulation blanket
covering the transducer. To obtain the noted resp_me requires severely
degraded insulation, probably because of burni_ of the insul&tion or
pressurization of the b_ with hot gu.
I
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The service propulsion helium line temperature (fig. 4-32) increased
from 84.6 ° to 89° F in about 37 seconds. In 2 more mlnutes, the tempera-
ture had increased to 92.2° F. A gradual cooling trend followed, and
l0 minutes later, the temperature had decreased to 83.4° F. During the
two command and service module power-up cycles at 101:55:54 and 123:05:19,
the helium line temperatures were 72.1° and 65.9 ° F, respectively. The
initial rise rate is again _ndicative of direct heating in the vicinity
of the transducer. However, unlike the oxidizer tank surface temperature,
the gradual decrease in helium line temperature, after the initial rise,
is indicative of a cool-down response to radiant heat loss. The helium
line cooled gradually because of the lower temperature levels with the
fUel cells shut down and the bay 4 panel missing.
Bay 3 reaction control quad 6 helium tank temperature (fig. 4-29)
rose from 79.7° to 81° F in about l0 s_conds. The temperature continued
to rise to approximately 83° F about 5 minutes later, then it gradually
decreased to 81.6° F.
Although all fuel cell radiator glycol inlet and outlet temperatures
showed perturbations, the fUel cell 3 raddator inlet temperatures exhibit-
ed the largest response. The temperature increased from 93.1 ° to 9.7.4° F
in 3 seconds or less. This represents the highest response rate noted
from any of the transducers at the time of the incident. The data for
fUel cell 3 radiator inlet temperature, and for other transducers, are
shown in figure 4-33. A correlation of these data has been performed and
it is concluded that these transducers could have been exposed to a sud-
den change in temperature environment prior to the data loss. An extrapo-
lation can be made which would SUl_Ort the response noted at the time of
the heat pulse (fig. _-33), but it would depend on the heat input function.
Tests performed with the temperature sensor installed on the glycol line
and with glycol flowing indicate thEt the heat pulse would lead the rise
point by about 0.25 second. The rise point can reasonab]_r be extended to
any time during the data loss. Assmning the rise point stsrte_ at the
time of the data loss, then the he(t pulse would have started at approxi-
mately the same time as the accelerometer disturbances, indicating that
the high heating rate started before the ba_ _ panel separated. The data
indicate that the high-heating environment extended throughout be_s 3 and o .
k.8 SPACECRAFT DYNAMIC RXSPOIISE '_
At the time of the incident, x]?ece_'a,._ attitude control m being _ ;.-_ 4
provided by the digital sutopilot in the primary suidanee, navisstion, _' _
end control systen, At 55;51:23 In mnt_m_io maneuver had been lntl_ied ,o-_
to the attitude speelfled for obsez_r_tloa of the B_ CGaet, end the _ _'-
,p ecrt va,ro;Ainsato.2aeree/,ea, aaA=e ien eent:o
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quads were enabled for pitch and yaw and quads A and C for roll. No en-
gines were firing at the time of the incident. All guidance and control
system equipment was powered up except the optics.
The stabilization and control system recorded the small body rate
oscillations described in section 4.6_ at 0.28 second before the loss of
data. When data were regained, negative rates were present in all three
axes (fig. 4-34). The oscillations shown in the pitch and yaw axes on
the figure are predcminantly due to excitation of the first bending mode
(2.7 hertz). The reaction control engine firings which occurred following
resumption of data were proper for the conditions that existed. The re-
sulting angular accelerations in pitch and roll, however, indicate that
only one thruster was acting in each axis and that quad C was inoperative. !
The total attitude change was small (fig. 4-35). _i
!
The loss of data precludes an accurate estimation of the character i
of the torque applied; however, the net change in angular kinetic energy _•
•_s approximately 90 ft-lb. [
The inertial measurement unit accelerometers recorded a net velocity
change of 0.h ft/sec, predominantly in the vehicle Y-Z plane. An accurate
assessment of the direction of the force cannot be made because the mag-
nitude is at the one or two data bit level (0.18 ft/sec/bit). Assuming,
however, that the measured velocity change was accurate and that thruste; ,....
I firings did not degrsde the measurement, the net change in translationalkinetic energy was approximately 250 ft-lb.
I Venting fo_Inwed the incident and attitude control was maintained
I automatically by the digital autopilot until the loss of main bus B when
I the last minus pitch thruster was disabled. Periodic attempts were made
i to reestablish attitude control manually us:: _g the thruster emergency
i coils until the thrusters were reconfigured to main A. The venting dis-turbance torque is shown in figure 4-36. Figure 4-37 contains a time
! history of network doppler data and shows the effect of venting as well
as uncoupled thruster firings.
4.9 LOSS OF TELEMETRY DATA I_I'IPrior to the incident, the spacecraft was transmitting and receiving /"
the S-band signals through the high-gain antenna, which was operating in I
the auto-track and narrow beam mode. Imnediately before the incident, __i
the high-gain antenna was pointing along the line-of-sight shown in
figure h-29. i
At 55:5h:53.57 all ground station receivers lost phase lock bec&use
of a sudden interruption of t_e signal. Two-wL7 phase lock was regained
l
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at 55:54:54.12. As shown in figure 4-29, the received c_-rier power in-
creased to a level consistent with receipt of good quality high-bit-rate
telemetry data through the Goldstone 210-foot antenna at 55:54:55.37.
The data indicate that the interruption of signal was caused by the
physical damage to one of the four high-gain antenna dishes requirea for
the narrow beam mode. The data also indicate that the high-gain antenna
automatically switched to the wide beam mode.
4.10 LOSS OF FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE
Three fuel cells are located in bay 4 of the service module
(fig. 3-2). Each f._l cell consists of a cell stack, hydrogen and oxygen
control systems, a water removal system, and a thermal control and heat
rejection system (fig. 4-38).
Following the incident, the fuel cell 1 regulated nitrogen pressure
indication was at the lower limit of the measurement. The nitrogen regu-
lator is intelnally referenced to vacuum and maintains an absolute level
of the nitrogen gas over the full range of fuel cell operating conditions.
The regulator vents downstream pressure to maintain control of overpres-
sure. The oxygen and hydrogen regulated pressures, which are referenced
to the nitrogen system pressure, remained normal after the loss of _ndi- '....
cated nitrogen pressure, confirming that proper nitrogen pressure was
maintained by the regulator. Consequently, there was a loss of the in-
strumentation during the data dropout period.
About 2.5 minutes after the loss of pressure in cryogenic oxygen
tank 2, the regulated oxygen pressures for fuel cells 1 and S decreased
to nitrogen system pressure levels such that these fuel cells could no
longer support a load.
The oxygen and hydrogen regulators are similar in operation to the
nitrogen regulator. The regulators maintain the reactant pressure at a
constant level above the nitrogen reference pressure over the full range
of gas consumption -- from zero flow to full power operation plus purge. _
The oxygen and hydrogen pressure must be maintained at a minimum of 2 psi
above the nitrogen reference pressure to prevent the electrolyte solution -' _
(aqueous potassium hydroxide) from crossing the electrode interface _=,- .
(fig. _-39) and causing loss of fuel cell performance. Figure _-_0 shows _.
the pressure decs_ at which point the fuel cells were flooded, causing a ._"
subsequent loss of performance. _- ;_" "
The pressure decks on fuel cells i and S were caused by closure of ,,_ _:
- the fuel cell oxygen reactant shutoff valves. When the valves closed, a
volume of high pressure o_gen web trapped between the reactant valves
N
I
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and the fue],cell oxygen regulators. This oxygen was sufficient for fuel
cell operation for about 2.5 minutes, the time required to deplete the
trapped supply. The agreement between the calculated and actual operat-
ing time after valve closure (fig. 4-40) verifies that fuel cells 1 and
3 were starved of oxygen and eventually could not support an eloctrical
load.
Impact tests on the oxygen solenoid valves (fig. _-41) show that a
shock in excess of 86g for ll milliseconds duration can be expected to
cause valve closure under operating conditions.
The prer_enee of a shock is further verified by the fact that the
service modl_le reaction control valves on quad C were closed. These
valves can be switched closed at levels of 80g in lO milliseconds.
Flight experience has frequently shown a closure of one or two of the
reaction control isolation valves when the service module is separated
from the adapter pauels ; an explosive charge is used to sever the skin
attachme nt.
The crew did not receive an indication of the shock,closure of the
solenoid valves since the hydrogen and o_rgen solenoid valve "talkback"
indicstors are electrically connected in sL,_rlesfor each fuel cell. The
detection system, therefore, will show "bazberpole" only when both the
hydrogen and oxygen valves are closed for a ..fuelcell ea_dnot for closure
of either vslve.
Fuel cell 2 performance was normal bet'ore and immediately after the
period of data loss. When fUel cells 1 and 3 were removed from the buses,
fl_el cell 2 assumed the total spacecraft, electrical power load of approxi-
mately 60 amperes. Fuel cell 2 continued to operate normally until approx-
imately 57 hours 46 minutes when the oxygen tsnk 1 pressure decked to
below the required Lnlet press,_re of the fUel cell oxygen regulator. The
oxygen regulated pressure then dropped to the nitrogen p_mssure levcl where
the fuel cell could no longer sustain the load and was removed from the
. bus. The shutdown mode was identical to that experxenced by fuel cells 1
and 3.
Three caution and warning alarms for fUel cell 2 hydrogen high f._.ow
" rate occurred at about 56 hours and were caused by fuel cell 2 supportim_
the high power loads, which exceeded the 0.1617 pound per hour alarm trip ._
level for hydrogen flow. _
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4.11 FAILURE MECHANISM
A large number of postulated mechanisms were examined, and the scope
of the review is reflected in table 4-11. Many of the potential mechan- i
isms were quickly eliminated by comparing the end result, or the reaction
rste produced by the mechanism, against the observed flight data. Others
were eliminated on ghe basis of data from the literature or from tests
that showed the mechanism to be a second or higher order effect. Of the
mechanisms listed in the table as "possible," the one that satisfies the
flight data is initiation of combustion in the tank by electrical shorts.
The association of fan energization, the electrical shorts at the start
of pressure rise, and the availability of sufficient electrical energ_
in the fan circuit to cause ignition of the polytetrafluoroethylene led
to the fan motors and power leads being the most likely point of ignition.
Electrical power for the fans, heaters, and quantity probe system is
provided _brough a 24-pin electrical connector, which is the electrical
and mechanical interface with the cryogenic oxygen volume. Seventeen
wires and the shielded cable are soldered to the connector, and these
wires extend througi_ approximately 32 inches of conduit coiled in the
upper cap of the vacuuw, jacket and enter the pressure vessel through the
boss about 5 inches from the temperature sensor. The conduit is made
of Inconel X-750 (AMS 5582). Each wire is insulated with color-coded
polytetrafluoroethylene insulation about i0 mils thick. Table h-III
lists the materials in the connector and conduit. In addition, the wire
bundles for various systems are enclosed in heat-shrinkable type poly-
tetrafluoroethylene qleeving (O.O12-inch thick). A total of about 0.i
pound of polytetrafluoroethylene insulation is present in the electrical
connector and conduit and when totally combusted would yield about
195 Btu's of energy.
The fan wiring leads consist of two harnesses of four wires each for
the two 3-phase fan motors. Wires (MIL-W-16878, type E) are 26-gage
nickel and are coated with 0.010-inch polytetrafluoroethylene insulation.
Also, each harness of four wires is covered Jr.some regions with a poly-
tetrafluoroethylene sleeve of approximately 0.012-inch thickness. Wire
runs of the two fan harnesses are as indicated in figure h-42 and are
identical, except that the lower fan harness is routed through a tube in
the heater assembly.
The fan motor power leads internal to, and near, the heater assemb_,y
are extremely vulnerable to heat damage in abnormal operations. This has
been demonstrated dramatically in a test employing approximately 8 hours
of continuous heater operation. The insulation degradation caused in a
test simulating the detanking cycle used on oxygen tank 2, (discussed in
section 5.0) is seen in pictures of the wiriag which failed (fig. _-_3).
!
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TABLE h-ll.- INITIATION MECHANISMS
_,,i. _u 8lqt Data _sses sm_,_t
Fan Motor Assembly and Leads (Electrical)
Ohmic heating of field coils Ignition unlikely based on low pressure Unlikely
(stalled rotor) ig test data and low power input (30 watts
total per motor).
Continuous shorts (in leads Ignition possible based on hot wir_ Possible
or coil) ignition test data. Can get 1 to 2 8_nps
through fuse.
Intermittent shorts (in leads Sufficient energy available from inverter Possible
or coil or to housing) to ignite insulation (North Amerie8_
Rockwell and Manned Spacecraft Center
test).
Fabrication and assembly Both motors passed preflight room tern- Unlikely
error perature tests August 1966. Would require |,
degradation and failure after extended
period of normal usage. Data included Ielsewhere in the report.
Fan _btor Assembly and Leads (Mechanical) |
Loss of fan parts at h_gh RPM Loss of fan unlikely (self-locking nut Unlikely
(impact or friction ignition) and square shaft). Parts considered as ieont a_ nant s. '
Overheated bearing ignites Ignition temperature 463 ° C at 2000 psi Unlikely
Rulon A retainer gaseous oxygen.
Low energy source (motor torque 0.9 in-oz. )
limits energy input into bearing. When
bearing seizes, becomes stalled rotor
(covered separately).
Rotor or fan blade contacting Ignition of aluminum possible. Unlikely
adjacent structure (friction Preflight checkout showed no problem.
• ignition)
No cause for occurrence in flight.
Heater and Controls (Electrical)
Element shorted to sheath Heater not povered at time of incident. Unlikely
Heater operation normal in both tanks ._ _ ,
prior to tank incident (cryogenic data). _
Leads shorte_ to ground Heaters not powered at time of origin, Unlikely ,;
of incident. (Verified by detaJ.led _L _
Intermittent shorts (sparking) review of current tank pressure da_a. ) "
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TABLE _-iI.- IIJITIATIONMECHANISMS - Cont__nued
Mechanism I Significdnt Data I Assessmenta
Heater and Controls (Electrical) - Continued
Inadvertent operation of heater Flight data (current) voltage shows Unlikely
no indication of inadvertent operation.
Inadvertent operation would not account
for energy release in tank unless com-
bined with chemical reaction.
Oxygen in the_nal switch Previous operation normal and switch Unlikely
(i_ni%ed by spark or impact) in closed position at time of event.
Heater and Controls (Mechanical)
Impact 1
Friction Requires impact or energy source from Unlikely
some other event.
Shock wave
Material yielding NO failure or loadir_ mechanism in Unlikely
this time period which can be explained
Fracture by flight data.
Quantity Gage Assembly (Electrical)
Short between plates, and Off scale data could confirm short Unlikely
between plates and ground between plates.
Maximum power input less than 7.35
milli Joules
Insufficient data on ener_j required
to ignite insulation.
No correlation with flight voltage
transients.
RF heating Insufficient energy input. Analyzed Unlikely
by North American Rockwell to be
350 nanowatts maximum.
Quantity gage [,latelead No power to heater (not on) confirmed Unlikely
short to heater lead by main bus current data.
Maximum power input less than 7.35
milliJoules from probe.
] Insufficient data cn ener_ required
i to ignite.
i Temperature transducer short Flight data indicate normal function Unlikelyafter initial pressure rise in tank 2.
Maximum energy input is less than
mieroJoules.
!
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TABLE h-II.- INITIATION MECHANISMS - Continued
Mechanism Significant Data Assessmenta
Quantity Gage Assembly (Mechanical)
Impact I Requires prior event, not associated Unlikely
Friction with gage, for energy source.
Shock wave i
Yielding No loading mechanism. Unlikely
• Fracture Consistent with data.
Pressure Vessel (Electrical)
Ohmic heating to produce No sustained high currents, low power. Unlikely
overpressure Heater and fan leads could touch vessel.
Heater leads not powered, i
Spark discharge to pressure Same as above. Unlikely
vessel i
Pressure Vessel (Mechanical)
Impact Impact source not identified. Unlike].7
Friction Friction source not identified. Unlikely
Fracture Vessel intact after event initiation. Unlikely
Yielding Below yield stress when event initiated. Unlikely
Shock wave Shock source not identified. Unlikely
Vacuum Jacket and Associated Equipment (Electrical)
"i Ohmic heating of vacuum Jacket No internal current sources except Unlikely
i or pressure vessel vac-ion pump.No continuous high currents, no indi-cation of external arcing possibility.
Vac-ion pump failure resulting Requires oxygen leakage from tank to Unlikely
in sparking and ignition of cause difficulty. Vae-ion pump turned
material off prior to launch.
Vactmm Jacket and Associated Equipment (Mechanical)
I
Impact
Frierion j
0xTKen required, not available unless Unltkel,vFracture i
i leak or failure oecu,r_.Yielding
r
Flov from pressure vessel Long exposure of M_laz to liquid o_Een Posaible
leak csuslng ignltion of increue8 its impact 8ensitlvlt_ sad de-
aluminir_d M_lar tree of reactivitT. I_set threshold level
deereu_ ted the resetlvit_ F_oKreesu
from ehsrrin4 to the exposive state.
Al-m4niud J_lLr unacceptable in 344tttd
o_pn lnpa_.
m I
1971001140-093
82
TABLE 4-11.- INITIATION _ECHANISM8 - Concluded
Mechanism Significant Data Assessment a
Other Possible Causes
Foreign material in tank
a. Lubricant and glass beads Found on ground support equipment filter Possible
after first pad fill.
h. Rivet or rivet pin Oversize rivet hole in quantity gage.
c. Quantity gage button Flow stoppage during detanking.
spacers
d. Inadvertent substitu- Identieel size and shape parts for o_ygen
tion of titanium for tank and hydrogen tank. Same basic part
steel number, dash number different.
e. Broken safety wire Twisted Wire on Beech motors and filter,
Tank electric_;,connector AC current anomalies could be related. Possible
failure. (Baa connection Wire insulation is available fuel.
resulting in spark ignltica. )
Ionization due to cosmic radl- Solar events which occurred during flight Unlikely
atlon (resulting in spark dis- were after the event. Very high voltage
charge at quantity probe), required for dielectric breakdown of gas.
Gaseous fuels (such as hydrogen) Nutrients not availsble. Metabolic rate Unl/kely
produced by metabolism of micro- near zero at low ten, stature. Aerobic /
or6anisms specles are not known which produce oxi-
dizable products.
Triboelectric charging of tank Tank and shell are at vehicle potential. Unlikely
interior causing sl_rk igniti_
External plumbin_ problem Liquid o_gen flowing over pressure trau_- Unlikely
ducer c an cause epparent pressure increase.
Te_er_ture flight data and probe behavior
cannot be explained. BaM blow-out ques-
tionable. °
aUnlike_: EnergM so_ree unltke_v to produce obNrved fltlht data.
Possible : Ener_ so_c_ poms_b_V could produce flight data-_teAled en_Vsis perfonNd.
i \
!
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TABLE 4-III.- MATERIALS IN CONNECTOR AND CONDUIT
Number Wire size
Service of wires (AWG) Material
Heater 4 20 Silver plated copper, polytetra-
fluoroethylene insulated
Quantity probe 1 20 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene i
insulated (outer probe)
1 20 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene i
insulated (inner probe)
Temperature h 22 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene
sensor insulated
Motors 8 26 Nickel - pol_etrafluoroetlwlene
insulated
Sleeve Heat shrinkable pol_etrafluoro-
•._ ethylene tubing
Connector Inconel with gold plated pins
Solder 60 percent tin, h0 percent lead
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This test showed that insulation will be severely damaged by the abnormal
heater operation so that numerous locations for electrical shorts or arcs
are available when the fan circuits are powered.
l
By this mechanism, an arc ignition could occur in these leads. The
maximum electrical energy available in the fan motor wiring during the
first short is about 160 Joules. Tests confirm that the ignition energies
of this material by a spark source is less than 1 Joule. The rate of prop- • i
agation has been shown by tost to be greatly affected by flow and gravita-
tional conditions in the tank (zero-g rate is less than one-g rate). As
a result, it is difficult to assess actual Fropagation at the time of the
failure. The 14-second plateau in the pressure-tim_ flight data cculd be
due to partial blocking or slowing of the flame front as the flame _ropa-
gates to a grommet and must penetrate a thicker, better thermaily-sinked
component. Other barriers to propagation are also possible.
The total energy available from comolete combustion of tn_ wJre in-
sulation _as determined by estimating the weight of the wire insulation
and sleeve material and using literature data on the heat of combustion
of polytetrafluo_'oethylene (2100 to 2200 Btu/ib). These estimates are
summarized in table h-IV. Combustion of wire insulation will furnish
sufficient thermal energy for the process requiring minimum energy for
the tank pressure increase as described in section 4.3.
Tests have shows flame propagation into the conduit region will
cause rapid degradation and failu_-e of pressure integrity. It is also
significant that this is the only area where the wire insulation comes
in close proximity to the pressure shell. A test has shown that ignition
of the wire insulation at the electrical connector end resulted in very
rapid failure of the conduit with little pressure or temperature response
back in the sit,slated pressure vessel. A test with ignition outside the
conduit and propagation along wire insulaticm into the conduit caused
very rapid failure of the conduit. Additionally, a "torch" effect en-
larged the opening as a result of melting or burning of the metal in the
conduit tank interior region. This latter effect could explain the rapid
loss of pressure from tank 2 as well as other higher order effects.
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TABLE h-IV.- HEAT AW.ILABLE FROM WIPE INSULATION
Heat available
Location fxom wire insulation.
Btu's
Zone i* 195
Zone 2** 38.6
Zone 3*** 34._
-- i
*Zone 1 - Wire insulation in conduit from connector to tank- |
lconduit interface.**Zone 2 - Wire insulation from tank-conduit interface to lowest
portion of upper poly_etrafluoroethylene - 25 percent glass probe |
insu3a,tor. i
*m'Zone 3 - A!._other wire insulation.
I
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5.0 PREFLIGHT CONTRIBUTING EFFECTS
A comprehensive review of the histoI_" of cryogenic oxygen tank 2
was mad, to determine whether an unfavorable condition could have existed
prior to launch. This review included test records, materials review ._
' dispositions, and failure reports. No positive indication of any un-
favorable conditions prior to shipment could be found in the testing or
, inspections conducted. However, an abnormal condition was found in the
prelaunch detanking procedure which is discussed in the following para-
graphs.
In addition to the review discussed, a special review and demonstra-
tion of the assembly methods used to install the wiring, fans, heater .i
assembly, and quantity probe was made by the vendor for this investiga-
tion. The installation procedures for the heater, fan, and probe wiring
were found to be critical for several areas whera routing damage would not
be visible on tlle assembled product. However, this condition most likely
did not contribute to the ultimate loss of the tank pressure in flight.
A detailed assessment was also made of the incident where the oxygen
shelf hoist assembly failed during the factory removal of the tank shelf
(fig. 5-1). Analysis and test show that the maximum shock upward would
be about 7 g's, and the maximum shock downward would be about 15 g's.
Analytically, the components within the tank would be expected to with-
stand 100 g's shock. Consequently, this condition is not believed to
have contributed to the ultimate failure of the tank in flight.
! The condition which most probably led to the failure, occurred dur-
I ing the special detanking procedures used after the countdown demonstra- I
i tion test.
I The cryogenic oxygen tank 2 could not be off loaded after the initialfilling during the countdown demonstration test using the normal procedures.
The problem resulted from loose or misaligned _lumbing components in the
" dog-leg portion of the tank fill path (fig. 5-2). Allowable manufacturing
i tolerances are such that the tank may not be detanked normally under these
conditions. A test has verified this fact. The condition of loose plumb-
i . ing in the probe assembly, which existed in the tank before the detanking,was Judged to saf for flight in every aspect.
I After numerous attempts with gaseous oxygen purges and higher expul-
I sion pressures in an attempt to remove the fluid, the fluid was boiled
off through the use of tank heaters and fans, assisted by pressure cycling.
The sequence of detanking is shown in figures 5-3 and 5-4. The heater-on
I time was about hours. It was thought that no damage would be8 sustained
by the tank or its components because of the protection afforded by theinternal thermal witches.
II L..... L ...... I.,,I I _
I
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The thermal switches, which normally open at about 80° F, show no
sign of operation from the heater voltage data. Inflight, these switches
have not operated due to the temperatures in the tank. Further, the
switches in the past have not operated under a load on the ground, and
2
they were not designed or tested for this condition.
In the case of Apollo 13, the use of the heaters to assist in detank-
ing required the switches to open under load. This is the first time the y
switches were operated with 65 V dc and 6 amperes which is twice the nor-
mal flight operating condition', _r each heater. Tests show that opening
the switches under these grot_u_ _ow_ conditions will fuse the contacts
closed at the instant of power [nter_-uFtion (fig. 5-5). Tests have veri-
fied that when the heaters are on for the duration experienced during pre-
launch operations (approximately 8 hours), the fan motor wire insulation
is severely degraded (fig. 4-43).
Wiring can be damaged within a couple of hours, with the heaters
being "on" continuously as evidenced by the temperature on the heater
assembly (figs. 5-6 and 5-7).
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2310 2)O0 24OO 0100 O2OO O3OO 0_0
March27,1970 Time,e.s.t. March28°19"/0
Figure5-3.- Charaderlstlc$ofoxygentank2detanklngusingfansandheaters(COOT).
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Figure5-4.-Characteristicsofo_jcjentank2detinkingusingfallS,hmers,andGSEpressure(CDD11.
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(a) Switch cross section.
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(b) Welded contacts after test.
Figure 5-5.- Heater thermalswKch.
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Figure5-6.- Heater/fantemperaturesensorlocations
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Figure5-7.- Heater/fantypicaltestresults.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS
7
The analysis of the data and results of special tests associated
with the incident leads to the following conclusions.
i. The detanking problem which occurred during the countdown demon-
stration test resulted from loose or misaligned fill-llne plumbing comro-q
nents within the tank. This condition was not the direct cause of the
anomaly, but did result in the use of a special detanking procedure fol-
lowing the countdown demonstration test.
2. Both heater thermal switches failed closed from heater operation
during the special detanking. The failed switches allowed continuous
heater power to be applied, and led to severe damage of the insulation
on the power wires leading to a fan motor.
3, The failure of the thermal switches was caused by an incompati-
bility between the capacity of the switches and the voltage used from the
ground power supply.
h. A fi_'ewas started by electrical short-circuits in the wiring to
the fan motors inside oxygen tank 2 shortly after the fan circuits were
energized for the seventh time.
5. Burning of the ins.ulaticfl proceeded for about 80 seconds before
reaching the pressure vessel electrical conduit through which all elec-
trical tank wiring passes. The heat of the burning caused failure of the
Inconel conduit first, and ultimately led to the failure of the vacuum
dome and separation of the b_7 h structural panel.
6. The internal component design of the tank lends itself to pos-
sible damage which can go undetected. Further, the plumbing parts have
tolerance allowables which can build up to prevent normal detanking.
7. The design of the warning system for indicating the position of
the reactant valves to the f_ael cells does not allo_ detection of indi-
• vidual valve closures to any f_ael cell, a condition whi_:; existed during
this incident.
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7.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION
The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate mate-
rials which could be ignited by failure mechanisms present in the tank
and lead to burning within the tank, causing a structural failure. All
the electrical w_re_ will be sheathed with stainless steel, the fans will
be removed, a temperature sensor will be installed on the heater probe,
and the quantity probe will be manufactured from stainless steel instead
of aluminum. The fill line plumbing inside the tank will be improved,
and a mea/iswill be provided to warn the crew of an inadvertent closure
of the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves. Also, the fuel cell oxygen
• supply valve will be redesigned to isolate the polytetrafluoroethylene-
coatem wires from the oxygen.
For subsequent Apollo missions, a third cryog,." -,_gen tszJ_will }
be added to the service module. Additionally, a metJ _ay be required I
to provide a greater heat transfer from the heater probe for the oxygen !
high flow demands that will be required for Apollo 16 and subsequent !
missions, i
The warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified
to provide more i,_nediate and visible warnings of system anomalies.
1
f
!
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